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AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTES: CURTAILING 
ADJUDICATION OF DIVERSITY CASES OR BAD FAITH CAUSES OF 
ACTION? 
Brooke M. Gaffney
*
 
I.  OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this comment is to explore a problem facing Florida insurers; a 
problem that may prevent Florida insurers from exercising their right to litigate bad 
faith causes of action in federal court.
1
 This article demonstrates how the federal 
removal statutes, and amendments thereto, have potentially precluded insurers 
from removing some bad faith actions from state to federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction.
2
 This article details the divergence in opinion among Florida’s 
Southern and Middle District Courts in interpreting the federal removal statutes
3
 
and concludes with a prediction of how the split may be resolved by the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.
4
  
II.  INTRODUCTION TO A BAD FAITH PROBLEM 
Here is a hypothetical: Sidney Sly, a Florida resident, who is insured by 
insurance company Alpha, a Delaware corporation, files a claim with Alpha to 
recover damages sustained to her automobile while it was parked on the street 
outside her home. Sly’s insurance policy with Alpha includes property damage 
coverage for a maximum of $25,000. A representative of Alpha investigates Sly’s 
claim, and determines that the damages are not a result of the hit and run incident 
Sly reported, and refuses to pay her property damage claim. Sly hires an attorney, 
Carl Clever, who files a lawsuit against Alpha in a Florida state court on January 1, 
2012, alleging breach of contract and statutory bad faith by Alpha in refusing to 
pay Sly’s claim. Clever demands the limits of Sly’s $25,000 property damage 
policy.  
Alpha’s attorney, Sam Sharp, believes that a federal court will be a more 
favorable venue to adjudicate Sly’s claims and, therefore, removes the case to 
federal court on January 25, 2012, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),
5
 28 U.S.C. § 
 ________________________  
      *  Brooke M. Gaffney, Barry University School of Law, J.D. Candidate May 2014. 
      1.        See infra Part II. 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See infra Part V. 
 4. See infra Part VI. 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2011) (establishing that federal district courts have original jurisdiction in all civil 
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and citizens and subject of different states). 
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1441(a),
6
 and 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
7
 Sharp knows that Sly’s bad faith claim is 
premature, and seeks to abate the claim until the breach of contract claim is 
adjudicated.
8
  Clever strategically seeks to amend Sly’s Complaint on April 1, 2012 
to remove the bad faith claim. The amended complaint only includes a breach of 
contract claim and demand for $25,000 in damages—the limits of Sly’s property 
damage coverage with Alpha. 
While at first blush this appears to be a win for Sharp and Alpha, as they are 
now able to avoid disclosing privileged and perhaps proprietary information 
through the discovery process
9—there is a problem. The breach of contract claim, 
standing alone, without the bad faith claim, does not meet the federal court’s 
$75,000 jurisdictional requirements. Clever timely moves to remand the case back 
to state court, which he believes is a more favorable venue for Sly, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c).
10
 Sharp files a motion in opposition to the remand motion and 
brings to the federal court’s attention the difference in opinions among the federal 
district courts. Should the federal court remand the case back to state court at 
Clever’s insistence? Or, should the federal court retain jurisdiction over the case as 
Sharp advocates? 
Before this hypothetical is addressed further, a brief overview of bad faith is in 
order.  
 ________________________  
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2011) provides that:  
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action 
is pending. 
Id. 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (2011) provides that:  
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the 
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading 
setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 
days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been 
filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. 
Id. 
 8. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 886 F. Supp. 837, 842 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that the proper 
action to take is abatement when a bad faith claim is premature).  
 9. See NORM LACOE, LA COE’S PLEADINGS UNDER THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH 
FORMS 374 (2012 ed. 2012) (discussing Rule 1.280(246)). “Insurer’s work product discovery permitted in actions 
for failure to defend in good faith.” Id. See also Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121, 1129–30 (Fla. 
2005). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2011) provides that:  
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under 
section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may 
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a 
result of the removal. 
Id. 
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III.  INSURER BAD FAITH ACTIONS: CURRENT STATE OF FLORIDA LAW AND 
WHY BAD FAITH ACTIONS ARE A PROBLEM FOR FLORIDA INSURANCE 
COMPANIES AND FLORIDA INSURANCE CONSUMERS  
An insurer’s duty to act fairly and in good faith when settling a claim made by 
its insured, or when settling a claim by a third party against its insured, is an 
implied obligation imposed by law.
11
 An insurer must act fairly and in good faith in 
discharging its contractual responsibilities.
12
 Florida’s “bad faith” laws aim to 
protect Florida’s insurance consumers from unfair practices by insurers and enable 
injured parties to recover damages from insurance companies that fail to settle 
claims in good faith.
13
  
A “first party” bad faith cause of action is filed by an insured against his 
insurance company for failure to settle a claim by the insured.
14
 A “third party” bad 
faith cause of action is filed by the insured against his insurance company for 
failure to settle a claim of a third party against the insured;
15
 such claims 
potentially expose the insured to damages that are above the limits of his insurance 
policy.
16
 While Florida common law has long recognized only third party causes of 
action for bad faith,
17
 Florida Statute section 624.155 embraces both first and third 
party causes of action for bad faith in providing that “[a]ny person may bring a 
civil action against an insurer when such person is damaged.”18 
There are some prerequisites that need to be met whether one brings a common 
law bad faith claim or a statutory bad faith claim.
19
 First, if the plaintiff brings a 
first or third party bad faith claim under section 624.155, the insured must first file 
a Civil Remedy Notice with the Florida Department of Financial Services.
20
 The 
notice gives the insurer sixty days to cure the alleged violation.
21
 While the statute 
provides that “[n]o action shall lie if, within sixty days after filing notice, the 
damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected,”22 
the Florida Supreme Court has established that payment of a claim after the filing 
of a Civil Remedy Notice does not preclude a common law cause of action against 
the insurer for third party bad faith,
23
 nor does payment preclude a later finding of 
bad faith.
24
  
 ________________________  
 11. Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (citing 
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INSURANCE BAD FAITH, INTERIM REP. 2012-132, at 1 (Fla. 2011).  
 14. Id. at 2 (citing Opperman, 515 So. 2d at 265). 
 15. Id. at 2 (citing Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1991)). 
 16. Opperman, 515 So. 2d at 265. 
 17. Id. 
 18. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1) (2013). 
 19. Id. § 624.155(3)(a); Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 1270, 1275–76 (Fla. 2000). 
 20. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES CIVIL 
REMEDY SYSTEM, available at https://apps.fldfs.com/CIVILREMEDY/Default.aspx. (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). 
 21. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3)(d).  
 22. Id. 
 23. Macola v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 2006). 
 24. Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665, 676 (Fla. 2004). 
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Second, for first party claims, a bad faith action is premature and subject to 
dismissal if the claim is brought before the underlying action for the insurance 
benefits has been resolved in favor of the insured.
25
 For third party claims, 
generally, although an excess judgment against the insured is not always a 
prerequisite to bringing a bad faith cause of action against the insurer, the existence 
of a causal connection between the insurer’s alleged bad faith actions and the 
claimed damages must be proven before a cause of action for bad faith can 
proceed.
26
 
Critics of the law governing bad faith have stated that it “has 
helped to curb abuse and unfair practices” on the part of insurers, 
but “as quickly as bad-faith law developed to come to the aid of 
the disadvantaged party in a contract or fiduciary relationship, it 
has evolved into a litigation quandary that often misses its basic 
purpose.”27 
The proponents of Florida’s bad faith law reforms argue that the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys essentially “set up” insurers for bad faith.28 Their demands require the 
insurers to jump through numerous hoops under tight time constraints.
29
 They often 
fail to supply the insurers with complete records to enable them to properly 
evaluate claims, or make such vague and ambiguous allegations of bad faith in 
demand letters or Civil Remedy Notices that the insurer is unable to timely remedy 
the alleged violation.
30
 
Adversaries to bad faith law reforms, however, “contend that the current law 
provides necessary protections to consumers and that insurers set themselves up for 
bad faith by not acting fairly toward their insureds.”31 Whether or not reform is in 
order, the current state of the law means a higher cost of doing business for Florida 
insurers because they are seeing an increase in the number of bad faith claims filed 
since 2006; and consumers are also seeing higher premiums.
32
 Specifically, 
insurers are spending more on attorney’s fees and on reviewing extra-contractual 
claims.
33
 They are also spending more, on average, to settle bad faith claims and 
bodily injury claims under threat of subsequent bad faith litigation.
34
  
 ________________________  
 25. Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 1991); Vest, 753 So. 2d at 
1276. 
 26. Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893, 899–901 (Fla. 2010). 
 27. S. INTERIM REP. 2012-132 (Fla. 2011), supra note 13, at 3 (quoting Victor E. Schwartz & Christoper E. 
Appel, Common-Sense Construction of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad Faith, 
58 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1479 (2009)). 
 28. Janis Brustares Keyser, Settlement for the Policy Limits: It’s Tougher Than It Used To Be, 23 TRIAL 
ADVOC. Q. 8 (2004). 
 29. Id. at 9–10. 
 30. S. INTERIM REP. 2012-132 (Fla. 2011), supra note 13, at 4. 
 31. Id. at 4–5. 
 32. Id. at 14, 16; Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665, 685 (Wells, J., dissenting). 
 33. S. INTERIM REP. 2012-132 (Fla. 2011), supra note 13, at 14. 
 34. Id. at 15. 
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A 2010 commissioned study on the economic effects of Florida’s bad faith 
system supports the proponents’ argument for the reform of Florida’s bad faith 
law.
35
 The Hamm Study was conducted at the request of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform.36  
The Hamm Study contends that Florida’s bad faith law creates a 
financial incentive for litigation even when the claim is weak by 
“rendering the policy or coverage limits moot, so that the insured 
may recover more than the amount of insurance for which he or 
she has paid.” According to the study, this leads to increased 
insurance fraud because the heightened potential exposure deters 
insurers from conducting thorough investigations.
37
  
After hearing the call for reform, Florida’s Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
held a workshop in February of 2011 to allow proponents and opponents of 
reforming Florida’s bad faith laws to inform the Committee on their respective 
opinions and experience.
38
 Thereafter, the Committee drafted Senate Bill 1592 (SB 
1592), which proposed significant amendments to section 624.155.
39
 Specifically, 
SB 1592 “creates specific statutory standards for a bad faith claim against an 
insurer that would ‘apply equally and without limitation or exception to all 
common law remedies and causes of action for bad faith failure to settle,’” and also 
creates clearer lines defining insurer bad faith and other provisions to further level 
the playing field for insurers.
40
 Although SB 1592 passed the Judiciary Committee 
by a vote of four-to-three, it was never heard in the Committee on Budget,
41
 and 
was indefinitely postponed and withdrawn from consideration on May 7, 2011.
42
 
The companion bill, Bill 1187, passed in the Florida House, but died in the Civil 
 ________________________  
 35. Id. at 16. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
The Hamm Study comes to the conclusion that after adjusting for other factors that can 
influence premiums, allowing individuals to file third-party bad faith lawsuits is associated 
with a 30.2 percent increase in the median bodily injury insurance pure premium per 
vehicle. Although the study recognizes that [section 627.0651, Florida Statutes], bars 
insurance companies from including bad faith awards or settlements in their rate bases, it 
does not apply to settlements offered to reduce the risk of such actions before they are 
pursued. 
Id. at 16–17. In comparing Florida’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage pure premiums to other states 
without a defined first party bad faith cause of action, “[t]he Hamm Study concludes that Florida’s average 
premium for this coverage is 188 percent higher than the average for the states without first-party bad faith.” Id. at 
17. 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. S. INTERIM REP. 2012-132 (Fla. 2011), supra note 13, at 3; Gwynne A. Young & Johanna W. Clark, The 
Good Faith, Bad Faith, and Ugly Set-Up of Insurance Claims Settlement, 9 FLA. B. J. 10–12, (2011); see also S.B. 
1592, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), available at  
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2011/1592/BillText/c1/PDF; H.B. 1187, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2011/1187/BillText/Filed/PDF. 
 41. S. INTERIM REP. 2012-132 (Fla. 2011), supra note 13, at 3. 
 42. S.B. 1592, supra note 40. 
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Justice Subcommittee and was indefinitely postponed and withdrawn from 
consideration on May 7, 2011.
43
 
As it stands, Florida’s bad faith law “undoubtedly provides social benefit by 
encouraging insurers to make fair settlements.”44 On the other hand, the law’s one-
sided provisions regarding the insurer’s good faith obligations will continue to be 
exploited in some cases.
45
 Thus, insurers will continue to charge more and the 
insured will continue to pay more for insurance premiums. It follows then that if 
Florida’s legislature won’t level the playing field, insurers and the attorneys who 
defend them must utilize every technical and tactical advantage available to them 
in adjudicating bad faith causes of action. 
IV.  THE TROUBLE CONTINUES: 28 U.S.C. § 1446 AND WHY 28 U.S.C. § 1446 IS 
A PROBLEM IN DIVERSITY CASES INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF BAD FAITH BY 
FLORIDA INSURERS 
Let us return now to the question posed by Sly’s hypothetical situation in Part 
I. Should the federal court remand Sly’s case back to state court at Clever’s 
insistence? Or, should the federal court retain jurisdiction over the case as Sharp 
advocates? Before we can explore this issue and the parties’ respective arguments, 
we need to consider why Sharp removed Sly’s case when he was well aware of the 
Blanchard
46
 holding and the applicable provisions of the U.S. Code pertaining to 
removal and remand.
47
  
In 1983 and 1984, U.S. Senate hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts of 
the Committee of the Judiciary on the problem of civil case backlogs in the federal 
judicial system in district and appellate courts revealed that “[d]iversity cases 
require the expenditure of an inordinate amount of judicial resources where the 
federal interest is dubious at best.
48
 “Diversity cases take more judicial time to 
handle and more frequently go to trial than federal question cases, at the expense of 
federal question cases.”49 Through these hearings, the Senate called Congress’ 
attention to the problem and requested its help in the “abolition and curtailment of 
diversity jurisdiction.”50  
In response to the court’s call for help, in 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) was 
amended by the passage of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act by 
 ________________________  
 43. H.B. 1187, supra note 40. 
 44. Young & Clark, supra note 40, at 9. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 1991)) (holding that a 
statutory bad faith claim does not exist until the underlying first party action on the policy has been resolved in 
favor of the insured).  
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2011). 
 48. Civil Case Backlogs in Federal District Courts: Hearing on The Problem of Civil Case Backlogs in the 
Federal Judicial System in District and Appellate Courts Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 12 
(1984) (statement of  J. Elmo B. Hunter,  Senior United States District Court Judge and Chairman of the 
Committee on Court Administration on the Judicial Conference). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 13 
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the 100th Congress.
51
 During the Senate proceedings and debates Wisconsin 
Representative, Robert Kastenmeier, remarked that when the Act was first 
introduced in the House, he read from a letter sent to him by Chief Justice William 
H. Rehnquist: “[t]his bill is probably the most significant measure affecting the 
operation and administration of the Federal Judiciary to be considered by the 
Congress in over a decade.”52 In agreeing with the Chief Justice, Representative 
Kastenmeier remarked that “the bill was much needed” in light of the “constantly 
burgeoning caseloads of the Federal Courts.”53  
As amended (and up until December 7, 2012), U.S.C. § 1446 provided that, 
(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be 
filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through 
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth 
the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, 
or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant 
if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not 
required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is 
shorter.  
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice 
of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the 
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended 
pleading, motion, or order or other paper from which it may first 
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 
removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of 
jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year 
after commencement of the action.
54
 
In what Congress referred to as a “modest curtailment,”55 the 1988 amendment 
effectively put “a one-year outer limit on the removal—measured from the action’s 
commencement—if the purported removal basis is the diversity of citizenship of 
the parties.”56 What this means for Florida practitioners is that a removable action 
must be removed to federal court from a state court within one year of the filing of 
the original complaint, if federal jurisdiction is based on diversity.
57
 This spells 
trouble for defendant insurers.
58
 The amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) allows a 
plaintiff with the motive of defeating removal to join a diversity destroying 
 ________________________  
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 cmt. (2011). 
 52. 134 CONG. REC. H10430, 10441 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
 53. Id. 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2011) 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 cmt.; Yosef Rothstein, Ask Not for Whom the Bell Tolls: How Federal Courts Have 
Ignored the Knock on the Forum Selection Door Since Congress Amended Section 1446(B), 33 COLUM. J. L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 181, 195 (2000). 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 cmt.  
 57. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.050 (providing that a civil action is deemed commenced when the complaint or 
petition is filed).  
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 cmt. 
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defendant and then wait until after a year has passed to drop them,
59
 or wait to 
disclose the true amount in controversy in diversity cases until after the one year 
limitation on removal expires.
60
 The likelihood of experiencing these evils, 
however, has been reduced by the most recent amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446,
61
 
discussed further in the last section.
62
 
Returning to the hypothetical in Part II of this article, depending on which 
federal district court in Florida Sly’s action was removed to, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(b), Sharp could lose entitlement to remove the case if he waits more than 
thirty days after the complaint is filed to remove the action.
63
 Also, it would be 
unrealistic for Sharp to assume that Sly’s breach of contract claim will be 
adjudicated within one year, thus allowing Sharp to timely remove the bad faith 
action in Sly’s proposed Amended Complaint, assuming Sly prevails on the breach 
of contract claim. In the fiscal year of 2011–2012, approximately 4,000,000 
complaints and petitions were filed in Florida’s trial and appellate courts,64 where 
there are only 4.5 judges per 100,000 people.
65
 Further, Sharp cannot seek to 
remove only the bad faith cause of action because, again, it is premature if filed 
before the breach of contract claim is resolved.
66
 But, there are other considerations 
playing in to Sharp’s prompt removal to federal court.67 
Generally, plaintiffs prefer state court,
68
 where judges may be biased in favor 
of resident plaintiffs because of political considerations.
69
 Insurers, on the other 
hand, find federal court a more favorable setting for the disposition of coverage 
issues,
70
 particularly when an insurer’s bad faith is at issue.71 Another important 
consideration, and perhaps the most important one, is the standard for granting 
summary judgment in state courts versus federal courts. Plaintiffs bringing breach 
of contract and bad faith claims have a better opportunity to defeat summary 
 ________________________  
 59. Id. “The amendment may sometimes give too much control to the state court plaintiff who wants to 
resist a removal to the federal court at all costs. It can invite tactical chicanery.” Id.  
 60. Rothstein, supra note 55, at 188.  
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (2011). 
 62. See infra Part VII. 
 63. Daggett v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., No. 2:08-CV-46-FTM-29DNF, 2008 WL 1776576, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 
17, 2008) (remanding action removed when original complaint bringing declaratory judgment action was 
removable before bad faith action was added by amended complaint thus defendant’s removal after amended 
complaint was untimely).  
 64. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA,  at 11 (2012) available at 
http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/pubs/bin/annual_report1112.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. See Curran v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 6:09-cv-463-Orl-28DAB, 2009 WL 2003157, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. July 2, 2009) (finding that removal of bad faith cause of action alleged in amended complaint was 
premature where verdict on UM coverage was still on appeal); Jenkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 5:08-cv-285-OC-
10GRJ, 2008 WL 4934030, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2008) (finding that removal of bad faith cause of action 
alleged in amended complaint was premature where final judgment on UM coverage was on appeal). 
 67. STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS AND LIABILITY & DAMAGES § 10:9 (2d ed. 2013).
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Rothstein, supra note 55, at 182–83 (citing John R. Cashin, Plaintiff’s Nation, BEST’S REVIEW-
PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE EDITION, July 1, 1998). 
 70. WILLIAM E. WRIGHT, JR., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 
LITIGATION  § 49:23 (David Leitner, Reagan Simpson, & John Bjorkman eds., 2005). 
 71. DIANNE K. DAILEY & MADELEINE S. CAMPBELL, THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH IN LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INSURANCE   COVERAGE LITIGATION § 29:8 (David Leitner, Reagan Simpson, & John Bjorkman eds., 2005). 
8
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judgment in state court, where the moving party must “overcome ‘all reasonable 
inferences’ that there is an issue of material fact to be tried.”72 By contrast, in 
federal court, an insurer must prove only that “a reasonable jury would not have a 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”73 
This brings us to the crux of this comment and to Sharp’s ultimate dilemma in 
determining when to remove Sly’s action to federal court: the divergence in 
opinion in interpreting 28 U.S. § 1446(b) between Florida’s Middle and Southern 
District Courts
74
 which to date remains unsettled by the Eleventh Circuit Court, 
although the conflict is now, perhaps, questionable.  
V. THE DIVERGENCE IN OPINION INTERPRETING 28 U.S.C. § 1446(B) AMONG 
FLORIDA’S SOUTHERN AND MIDDLE DISTRICT COURTS 
An analysis of decisions concerning 28 U.S. § 1446(b) and removal after one 
year reveal that, generally, the Southern District of Florida favors remand,
75
 and the 
Middle District does not.
76
 The Middle District will deny remand even when an 
action is removed more than one year after the action’s commencement.77 Well, at 
least perhaps until very recently. 
We begin the discussion with the Middle District. In 2006, the court in 
Suncoast v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co.
78
 remanded a case originally brought by 
plaintiffs against the defendant’s insured in 1998.79 In 2005, after the plaintiffs 
settled their claims with the defendant’s insureds, they amended their complaint to 
add the defendant insurance company.
80
 The court held that the joinder of an 
 ________________________  
 72. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INSURANCE BAD FAITH, INTERIM REP. 2012–132, at 8 (Fla. 2011).   
It has been suggested by practitioners that bad faith plaintiffs prefer the state court forum 
because of the lower likelihood of having the case disposed of on summary judgment, even 
in the event of a potentially weak case. Proponents for revision of Florida’s bad faith law 
have stated that since the decision in Berges v. Infinity Insurance Co., . . . no state court has 
granted summary judgment in favor of an insurance company in a bad faith case based on 
an unreasonable condition or timeframe.  
Id. (citing Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2004); Transcript of Hearing for HB 1187 Before the H. 
Civil Justice Subcomm., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (2011)). 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). 
 74. See infra Part V. This Comment does not address the Northern District of Florida due to the apparent 
lack of substantive opinions from the Northern District pertaining to the one-year limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(b). 
 75. See Moultrop v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Lopez v. Robinson 
Aviation (RVA), Inc., No. 10-60241-CIV, 2010 WL 3584446 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2010); Potts v. Harvey, No. 11-
80495-CIV-MARRA, 2011 WL 4637132 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2011); Wohlgemuth v. Wohlgemuth, No. 08-80138-
CIV, 2008 WL 4610034 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2008). 
 76. Barnes v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 8:10-cv-2434-T-30MAP, 2010 WL 5439754, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 
28, 2010). 
 77. Id.; See Love v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford, No. 8:10-CV-649-T-27EAJ, 2010 WL 2836172, at 
*3 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2010); Lahey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1949-T27-TBM, 2008 WL 
1766764, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2008); Lahey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1949-T27TBM, 
2007 WL 2029334, at *1, 4 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2007). 
 78. Suncoast Country Clubs, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1238-T-23MSS, 2006 WL 2534197, 
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2006). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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insurer for the purpose of a state court ‘“direct action’ is bound by the one-year 
deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446,” and noted that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has urged 
district courts to heed the ‘bright line limitations on federal removal jurisdiction’ as 
‘an inevitable feature of a court system of limited jurisdiction that strictly construes 
the right to remove.’”81 
Just a year later, the Middle District appeared to stray from Suncoast in its 
decision in Lahey v. State Farm.
82
 In Lahey, the plaintiffs filed an action against 
State Farm in state court in September 2001 alleging only a claim to 
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) benefits.83 The jury awarded Lahey 
damages in excess of Lahey’s $300,000 UM policy limits with State Farm.84 The 
court then reduced the award to $300,000.
85
 While the judgment was on appeal, the 
state court authorized the Laheys to amend their complaint to include a statutory 
bad faith claim against State Farm.
86
 On September 22, 2006, the Laheys filed their 
amended complaint and on October 20, 2006, nearly five years after 
commencement of the initial action, State Farm removed the bad faith claim to the 
Middle District Court.
87
 The Laheys sought remand to state court relying on the 
one-year removal limit for diversity cases.
88
 
The Middle District denied the Laheys’ motion to remand the case back to state 
court and held that State Farm was not precluded from removing the case more 
than one year after the original UM claim was filed.
89
 The Middle District relied on 
Florida Supreme Court precedent
90
 and reasoned that the “[p]laintiffs’ bad faith 
claim [was] a cause of action ‘separate and independent of’ the underlying UM 
claim and was therefore separately removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).”91 
Although confronted with conflicting opinions from the Southern and Middle 
 ________________________  
 81. Id. (quoting Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 82. See Lahey, 2007 WL 2029334 at *1. 
 83. Id. at *1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Lahey, 2007 WL 2029334 at *1. 
 89. Id. at *2. 
 90. Id. 
Under Florida law, a statutory bad faith claim is ‘separate and independent’ of the claim 
arising from the contractual obligation to perform under the policy. A statutory bad faith 
claim does not exist until the underlying first party action on the policy has been resolved in 
favor of the insured . . . . Moreover, as we approved in Blanchard, a claim arising from bad 
faith is grounded upon the legal duty to act in good faith, and is thus separate and 
independent of the claim arising from the contractual obligation to perform.  
Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1235 (Fla. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 91. Lahey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1949-T27-TBM, 2008 WL 1766764, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2008). The Lahey court does not recite any provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) in the opinion 
but based on the phrase quoted in the court’s opinion, it can be surmised that the court’s reference to subsection (a) 
was an error and should have been a reference to subsection (c). 
10
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Districts,
92
 the Middle District Court denied the Laheys’ motion for reconsideration 
in 2008.
93
 
Given its use of the phrase “separate and independent,” it appears that the 
Lahey court’s decision is based, in substantial part, on the original version of 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 wherein subsection (c) (not subsection (a)) referenced “separate and 
independent.”94 Specifically, the original version of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (effective 
prior to the 1990 amendment to section (c)) provided that:  
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action 
which would be removable if sued upon alone is joined with one or 
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the 
entire case may be removed and the district court may determine 
all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in 
which State law predominates.
95
 
Subsection (c) of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, however, was amended in 1990
96
 and the 
text “which would be removable if sued upon alone,” was replaced by “within the 
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title.”97 Thus, after the 1990 
amendment and at the time Lahey was decided in 2007, separate and independent 
claims could only be removed if based on a federal question.
98
 The version of 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 that was effective in December 2011, makes no mention of 
“separate and independent” anywhere in the text of the statute and completely 
eliminates section (c) (quoted above) appearing in earlier versions.
99
 So, while 
prior to the 1990 amendment it was the diversity cases that most often benefited 
from subsection (c), after the amendment, it appears the diversity case can no 
longer invoke removal under subsection (c).
100
 
Despite this 1990 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and the clear language 
requiring separate and independent claims removed to involve federal questions, 
the Middle District refused to stray from Lahey in deciding Love v. Hartford
101
 and 
Barnes v. Allstate
102
 in 2010.
103
 Noting that “there are divergent views on the 
 ________________________  
 92. See Suncoast Country Clubs, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1238-T-23MSS, 2006 WL 
2534197, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2006); see also McCreery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 07-80489-
CIV-Hurley/Hopkins (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2007) (holding that addition of new state law claim would not allow 
defendant to get around the otherwise applicable one year bar); see also Williams v. Heritage Operating, L.P., No. 
8:07-cv-977-T-24MSS, 2007 WL 2729652, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s motion to 
amend started the thirty day clock for removal). 
 93. Lahey, 2008 WL 1766764 at *4. 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1990) (amended 2011). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1990) (amended 2011). 
 100. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 cmt. 
 101. See Love v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford, No. 8:10-CV-649-T-27EAJ, 2010 WL 2836172, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. July 16, 2010). 
 102. See Barnes v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 8:10-cv-2434-T-30MAP, 2010 WL 5439754, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. 
Dec. 28, 2010). 
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issue,”104 the Love court refused to remand a bad faith cause of action included in 
the plaintiff’s amended complaint, over two years after the initial complaint—
demanding benefits to the insured’s $200,000 in UM coverage—was filed.105 
Interestingly, the Middle District’s opinion in Love did not mention 28 U.S.C. § 
1441.
106
 Instead, the Love court focused on 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and determined 
that it “establishe[d] two distinct removal periods.”107 
The first applies where the federal jurisdiction can be determined 
from the initial pleading. The second applies where the initial 
pleading fails to disclose sufficient grounds to support federal 
jurisdiction. Both allow a [thirty] day window for removal. The 
first window opens when the initial pleading is served. The second 
window opens when the first document demonstrating that 
removal is proper is served.
108
 
While reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Pretka v. Kolter109 seems 
misplaced because it appears that the Love case was removable at the time the 
plaintiff filed his initial complaint that sought $200,000 in UM benefits, and before 
amending its complaint to add the bad faith claim after a $1,598,357.90 verdict was 
entered in plaintiff’s favor,110 the Love court appears to side-step this issue using 
the same reasoning it relied on in Lahey. Reiterating that a bad faith cause of action 
cannot accrue before the conclusion of the underlying litigation for contractual 
benefits, the Love court reasoned that because of this, a bad faith cause of action is 
removable as a separate cause of action upon service of the initial pleading setting 
forth the claim and thus the one year limit of 28 U.S.C. § 1446 was not 
implicated.
111
 
The Middle District utilized the same reasoning (making no reference to 28 
U.S.C. § 1441) in its decision in Barnes v. Allstate
112—a case with facts very 
similar to those in Love; although, it appears that the initial complaint did not assert 
a removable action.
113
 In finding that the defendant in Barnes timely removed the 
bad faith cause of action within thirty days of the state court’s affirmance of the 
  
 103. The revised version of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, incorporating the 1990 amendment, was not reflected in the 
language of § 1441 until the formal revision of § 1441 effective on December 7, 2011. 
 104. See Love, 2010 WL 2836172 at *3. 
 105. Id. at *1–3. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at *2 (citing Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 759–60 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the second paragraph of § 1446 extends the time for filing notice of removal under the stated circumstance).  
 108. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). 
 109. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 759–60 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 110. Love v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford, No. 8:10-CV-649-T-27EAJ, 2010 WL 2836172, at *2 (M.D. 
Fla. July 16, 2010).  
 111. Id. at *2–3. 
 112. See Barnes v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 8:10-cv-2434-T-30MAP, 2010 WL 5439754, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. 
Dec. 28, 2010). 
 113. Id. at *3. 
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final judgment, the Middle District Court noted that “a party cannot waive a right 
that it does not yet have.”114 
Now we turn to the Southern District of Florida. The court in Wohlgemuth v. 
Wohlgemuth,
115
 relied on an Alabama District Court decision,
116
 and construed 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(b) narrowly.
117
 The court noted that “the thrust of the comments in 
[the legislative] history [of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)] support” the Sasser court’s 
interpretation that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is not party specific and that where there are 
clashes about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.
118
 In 
Wohlgemuth, in 2004 the plaintiffs filed an action over the competing claims for a 
$1,000,000 annuity.
119
 In 2007, the plaintiffs filed a counterclaim against the 
intervening insurer and less than a year later, in 2008, the insurer removed the 
matter to the Southern District.
120
 Relying on the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(b) the Wohlgemuth court remanded the case even though the third party 
defendants were not named as parties to the action until the third party complaint 
was filed.
121
   
In the absence of more specific guidance form [sic] the Eleventh 
Circuit on this question this Court adopts the view of Sasser and its 
progeny, holding that the one year limitation in § 1446(b) applies 
from the date the underlying state court action was originally 
filed.
122
 
Lopez v. Robinson
123
 came before the Southern District Court approximately 
two years later.
124
 In Lopez, the plaintiff filed his complaint in state court on 
January 4, 2008, and then on October 1, 2009, filed an amended complaint adding 
Robinson as a defendant.
125
 After dismissal of a diversity destroying defendant in 
 ________________________  
 114. Id. at *3 (quoting Cruz v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 2009 WL 2180489, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 
2009)). 
 115. See Wohlgemuth v. Wohlgemuth, No. 08-80138-CIV, 2008 WL 4610034, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 
2008). 
 116. Id. at *2 (citing Sasser v. Ford Motor Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335–37 (M.D. Ala. 2001)). 
 117. Id. at *2. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at *1. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Wohlgemuth v. Wohlgemuth, No. 08-80138-CIV, 2008 WL 4610034, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2008). 
 122. Id. The Eleventh Circuit had already answered this question in Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc., 
536 F.3d 1202, 1209 (11th Cir. 2008) (endorsing the “last served defendant rule” wherein a newly served 
defendant has 30 days to remove an action even if the action was pending for longer than a year before that 
defendant was served). 
[W]e are convinced that both common sense and considerations of equity favor the last-
served defendant rule. The first-served rule has been criticized by other courts as being 
inequitable to later-served defendants who, through no fault of their own, might, by virtue of 
the first-served rule, lose their statutory right to seek removal.  
Id. at 1206.  
 123. See Lopez v. Robinson Aviation (RVA), Inc., No. 10-60241-CIV, 2010 WL 3584446, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 21, 2010). 
 124. Id. at *1. 
 125. Id.  
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January 2010, Robinson removed the case from state court on February 19, 
2010.
126
 The Lopez court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand pursuant to its 
decision in Wohlgemuth and the Alabama court’s decision in Sasser.127 The court 
reasoned that: 
[I]f Congress intended to make “commencement of the action” 
under § 1446(b) party or claim specific, it could have easily done 
so by modifying the statute to read that “a case may not be 
removed by a party on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by 
section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of 
the action against that party.
128
 
The Lopez court relied upon the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure section 1.050.
129
 The court acknowledged that 
“commencement of action” means when the original complaint is filed, but looked 
to the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) for “additional clarification.”130 
Noting that the one year limitation was added by the Judicial Improvement and 
Access to Justice Act of 1988, the Lopez opinion recited the following passage 
from the Act, “which provided only the following discussion of the amendment’s 
purpose.”131 
Subsection (b)(2) amends 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to establish a one 
year limit on removal based on diversity jurisdiction as a means of 
reducing the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has 
been made in state court. The result is a modest curtailment in 
access to diversity jurisdiction. The amendment addresses 
problems that arise from a change of parties as an action 
progresses toward the trial in state court. The elimination of parties 
may create for the first time a party alignment that supports 
diversity jurisdiction. Under section 1446(b), removal is possible 
whenever this event occurs, so long as the change of parties was 
voluntary as to the plaintiff. Settlement with a diversity-destroying 
defendant on the eve of trial, for example, may permit the 
remaining defendants to remove. Removal late in the proceedings 
may result in substantial delay and disruption.
132
 
The Lopez court, acknowledging that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) was 
to prevent removal late in the proceedings, determined, however, that 
“‘commencement of the action’ . . . cannot mean one thing under one set of 
 ________________________  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *2, *4–5. 
 128. Id. at *2. 
 129. Lopez, 2010 WL 3584446, at *2. 
 130. Id. at *3. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. 
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circumstances and another thing in a different set of circumstances.”133 The phrase 
“‘commencement of the action’ must have the same definition in every set of 
circumstances” and thus, an action was commenced when the original complaint 
was filed.
134
  
In Potts v. Harvey,
135
 the Southern District confronted the question of whether 
cases removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction were entitled to an 
exception of the one year limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) when the cases 
involved “separate and independent” claims.136 In Potts, the plaintiff filed suit 
against the defendant tortfeasor in September 2006, which resulted in an 
$8,000,000 verdict for the plaintiff.
137
 On April 14, 2011, the state court granted the 
plaintiff’s motion to join the insurer as a defendant, and the tortfeasor then asserted 
a crossclaim against the insurer on April 21, 2011, alleging bad faith.
138
 The insurer 
removed the tortfeasor’s claim to the Southern District Court on May 4, 2011.139 In 
remanding the action back to state court, the Potts court recited the current version 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) and noted that the 1990 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 
eliminated diversity jurisdiction as a basis for removal and limited removal under 
28 U.S.C. § 1441 to claims involving federal questions.
140
 The Potts court reasoned 
that the defendant insurer was attempting to do exactly what Congress intended to 
prohibit through the 1990 amendment.
141
 Further, although acknowledging that bad 
faith claims in Florida are “separate and independent” causes of action, the court 
noted that Congress deemed “separate and independent” causes of action irrelevant 
when a party seeks removal in diversity cases.
142
 
The Potts court did acknowledge that it was reaching a decision inconsistent 
with those cited herein from the Middle District.
143
 The Potts court, however, 
criticized the progeny of cases favoring removal because the cases “fail[ed] to 
discuss when it is appropriate to apply a ‘separate and independent’ analysis in the 
removal context, let alone the statutory prohibition against such an application in 
the diversity context.”144 
The Southern District Court stayed its course in Moultrop v. Geico Gen. Ins. 
Co.
145
 when it remanded a bad faith cause of action to state court on facts very 
similar to those in Potts.
146
 In so doing, the Southern District Court again noted the 
divergence of opinion and again criticized those opinions refusing remand as 
“devoid of any persuasive statutory interpretational theory or logic for recognizing 
 ________________________  
 133. Id. at *4. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Potts v. Harvey, No. 11-80495-CIV-MARRA, 2011 WL 4637132, at *1–4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2011).  
 136. Id. at *1. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at *2. 
 141. Potts, 2011 WL 4637132 at *2. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at *7–8. 
 144. Id. at *9. 
 145. See Moultrop v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
 146. Id. 
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a ‘separate and independent claim’ exception to the one-year repose bar of § 
1446(b) otherwise applicable in diversity cases.”147 The Moultrop court went on to 
acknowledge that the Eleventh Circuit had not ruled on the issue
148
 and as of the 
time of this writing, this remains true.  
The two most recent decisions from the Southern District are evidence that the 
Southern District remains unpersuaded by the Middle District’s decisions in Lahey 
and its progeny: Van Niekerk v. Allstate Insurance Company
149
 and Hoggins v. 
Mid-Continent Casualty Company.
150
 In Van Niekerk, the court granted plaintiff 
leave to amend its complaint to add the insurer as a defendant, and to assert a claim 
for bad faith against the insurer.
151
 Relying on its earlier decision in Lopez, finding 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1446 is not party or claim specific, the Van Niekerk court 
remanded the action to the state trial court but denied the plaintiff’s motion for 
attorney’s fees and costs.152 The Van Niekerk court ultimately concluded that “the 
bad faith claim [was] part of the ‘action,’ which, for purposes of § 1446(b) was 
commenced upon the filing of the complaint,” because a claim’s independence is 
not relevant in a removal action based on diversity.
153
 
Similarly, the Hoggins decision involved a plaintiff that was able to amend a 
negligence action, nearly three years after it was initially filed, to include a breach 
of contract action against a newly named defendant, the tortfeasor’s insurer.154 
Following consideration of plaintiff’s motion to remand and following defendant’s 
removal to the Southern District, the Hoggins court relied on the Southern 
District’s earlier decisions in Potts and Moultrop to remand the case back to the 
state trial court.
155
  
VI.  HAS THE MIDDLE DISTRICT COME AROUND TO THE SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT’S WAY OF THINKING? 
An August 30, 2012 decision from the Middle District may have marked an 
end to Lahey and the need for the Eleventh Circuit to resolve the diverging 
opinions between the Southern and Middle Districts.
156
 AFO Imaging v. State 
Farm
157
 came before the Middle District on the plaintiff’s motion to remand the 
action to state court on August 30, 2012.
158
 The AFO plaintiff-healthcare provider 
originally filed suit against the defendant-insurer in state court on October 22, 
2008, as assignee of insurance benefits of certain patients who had received 
 ________________________  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Van Niekerk v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 12-62368-CIV, 2013 WL 253693 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2013). 
 150. Hoggins v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 12-81159-CIV, 2013 WL 394882 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2013). 
 151. Van Niekerk, 2013 WL 253693, at *1. 
 152. Id. at *2, *4. 
 153. Id. at *4. 
 154. Hoggins, 2013 WL 394882 at *1. 
 155. Id. 
 156. AFO Imaging, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:12-cv-996-T-33TGW, 2012 WL 3764887 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2012). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at *1. 
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medical care from the plaintiff.
159
 Relying on the plaintiff’s statement at a motion 
to compel hearing that “it would seek ‘millions of dollars in punitive damages,’” 
the defendant removed the case to the Middle District on May 4, 2012.
160
 On May 
13, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint which pertained to the benefits 
of additional patients, not included in the original complaint.
161
  
In arguing against remand, the defendant urged that the plaintiff’s statement at 
the hearing “constituted an ‘other paper’ from which Defendant first ascertained 
that this case was removable.”162 The defendant further argued that the plaintiff’s 
amended complaint “commenced a new and independent action completely distinct 
from the action asserted in the 2008 complaint” because the identities of the 
patients in the first complaint were not the same as those listed in the amended 
complaint.
 163
  
In a very short opinion, the AFO court relied on the Southern District’s opinion 
in Lopez.
164
 At the time, the AFO court remanded the action, it conceded that 
“commencement of the action” under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) occurred when the 
original complaint was filed.
165
 In the AFO opinion, the Middle District made no 
mention of its earlier decisions, most notably Lahey or its progeny of cases, nor did 
it mention “separate and independent” or 28 U.S.C. § 1441.166 So, is that it? Is 
Lahey dead?
167
  
The answer to this appears to be “maybe so,” based on Bolen v. Illinois Nat’l 
Ins. Co.
168
 and two other recent decisions wherein the Middle District addressed a 
“separate and independent” bad faith action (as recognized by current Florida law), 
removed more than a year after the initial complaint was filed, in the context of 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(b).
169
 
In Bolen, following a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff filed a two-count 
complaint on April 12, 2007.
170
 Count one of the complaint alleged a claim for UM 
benefits and count two alleged a claim for statutory bad faith.
171
 Although the 
defendant moved to dismiss the bad faith count, the trial court instead abated the 
 ________________________  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. AFO Imaging, Inc., 2012 WL 3764887 at *1. 
 163. Id. at *2. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at *1–3.  
 166. Id. 
 167. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Cavalcante, No. 6:12-cv-1342-Orl-18DAB, 2012 WL 4466514, at *2 
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2012) (finding that foreclosure action brought years after the commencement of the action 
could not be removed as a matter of law because “the mortgage foreclosure complaint [did] not present a federal 
question and, assuming removal [was] attempted to be predicated on diversity jurisdiction, such removal [was] 
barred under the one year limit of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1)”). 
 168. Bolen v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 6:10-cv-1280-Orl-36DAB, 2012 WL 4856753 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 
2012) (cause coming before the court upon objection to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 
filed on August 28, 2012); see Bolen v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 6:10-cv-1280-Orl-37DAB, 2012 WL 4856811 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2012).  
 169. Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:13-cv-212-Ftm-99SPC, 2013 WL 2406320 (M.D. Fla. June 
3, 2013); Bolen, 2012 WL 4856753 at *4. 
 170. Bolen, 2012 WL 4856753 at *1. 
 171. Id. 
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bad faith claim until there was a final judgment or final order entered as to the UM 
claim.
172
 In 2010, the trial court entered an order of partial final judgment as to the 
UM claim and, thereafter, entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion to 
dissolve the abatement of the bad faith action.
173
 The defendant thereafter removed 
the case from the state trial court to the Middle District Court.
174
  
In support of removal, the defendant argued that the bad faith claim 
“commenced” on the date it accrued, not on the date the complaint was filed, and 
the court should treat the state trial court’s order abating the bad faith claim as a 
dismissal without prejudice for removal purposes.
175
 Noting that there was no 
controlling authority from the Eleventh Circuit, the Bolen court ultimately 
remanded the case back to the state trial court.
176
 The court explained that “because 
Plaintiff included a bad faith claim in her initial complaint and the state trial court 
did not dismiss it, it is deemed part of that case from the onset.”177 In so ordering, 
the Bolen court noted an apparent anomaly in Florida law: “Florida courts allow a 
plaintiff to assert a claim for bad faith at the onset of litigation [despite Blanchard, 
which established that a bad faith cause of action does not exist or accrue until the 
underlying claim is adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff], and further allow the 
claim to stand while the removal clock is ticking.”178 The Bolen court went on to 
note two further important pieces of this puzzle: “[u]nder Florida law, ‘[t]he proper 
remedy for premature litigation is an abatement or stay of the claim for the period 
necessary for its maturation under the law;’”179 and that “Florida courts have made 
clear that the abatement of a premature claim is treated as a stay, not a 
dismissal.”180  
How can it be that, although a bad faith cause of action in Florida cannot 
“exist” or “accrue” until the underlying claim giving rise to the alleged bad faith is 
adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff, it nevertheless “commences” at the time the 
initial complaint is filed? The Middle District Court most recently addressed this 
issue in Ludwig v. Liberty Mutual.
181
 
Similar to the facts of Bolen, the plaintiff in Ludwig filed a complaint alleging 
a count for UM benefits and a count for the insurer’s bad faith in 2009.182 Upon 
motion by defendant, the trial court abated the bad faith action until the UM claim 
could be adjudicated.
183
 Once the UM claim was rendered moot by the insurer’s 
tender to the plaintiff of the limits of the subject UM policy, and the trial court 
 ________________________  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at *2–3. 
 176. Bolen, 2012 WL 4856753, at *2, *4. 
 177. Id. at *3. 
 178. Id. (citing Daggett v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., No. 2:08-CV-46-FTM-29DNF, 2008 WL 1776576, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2008)). 
 179. Id. (quoting Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1065 n.2 (Fla. 2001)). 
 180. Id. (citing Pecora v. Signature Gardens, Ltd., 25 So. 3d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).  
 181. Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:13-cv-212-Ftm-99SPC, 2013 WL 2406320, at *1 (M.D. 
Fla. June 3, 2013). 
 182. Id. at *6. 
 183. Id.  
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denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the bad faith count, the defendant removed 
the action to the Middle District, approximately four years after the initial 
complaint was filed, in 2013.
184
  
The ultimate issue faced by both the Ludwig and Bolen courts was whether or 
not the bad faith claim commenced/accrued before the removal deadline expired 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
185
  
If, as Liberty Mutual argues, the action for Count II commenced 
on March 6, 2013, after Count I was dismissed, then the removal is 
timely and the case should stay in this Court. However, if the 
Plaintiff is correct and Count II commenced/accrued when the case 
was originally filed in 2009 then the action was improperly 
removed from the State Court and the action must be remanded 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
186
 
The Ludwig court observed that Florida courts have “moved toward the greater 
use of abatement,”187 and “[t]his practice presents several conceptual and practical 
difficulties in the removal context.”188 Ultimately, the court determined that, 
although the bad faith action was abated during the pendency of the UM claim, the 
bad faith action commenced in 2009, and thus, removal to federal court was 
untimely in 2013.
189
 
The Bolen and Ludwig decisions are important for three reasons, when we 
consider the hypothetical with which we began. First, both decisions indicate that, 
in the Middle District, Lahey is still alive; Bolen and Ludwig appear to make clear 
that removal was untimely because the bad faith cause of action was plead in the 
plaintiffs’ initial complaints, a fact distinguishable from Lahey.190 Thus, at least in 
the Middle District, a removing defendant could still, arguably, successfully 
remove a bad faith cause of action added to a complaint more than one year from 
the date the complaint was initially filed.
191
 Second, although 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
provides that “[a]n order remanding a case ‘may require payment of just costs and 
any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the 
removal,”‘192 both the Bolen and Ludwig courts refused to award attorney fees 
given the “conflict in authority regarding removal of similar claims in this 
district.”193 As a result, a defendant removing a bad faith action more than one year 
 ________________________  
 184. Id. at *1–2. 
 185. Id. at *3.  
 186. Id. 
 187. Ludwig, 2013 WL 2406320 at *4 (quoting O’Rourke v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 48 F. 
Supp. 2d 1383, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1999)). 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at *6.  
 190. See Bolen v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 6:10-cv-1280-Orl-37DAB, 2012 WL 4856811, at *3–4 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 28, 2012); see also Ludwig, 2013 WL 2406320 at *5. 
 191. Lahey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1949-T27TBM, 2007 WL 2029334, at *1 (M.D. 
Fla. July 11, 2007). 
 192. Ludwig, 2013 WL 2406320 at *7. 
 193. Id. See also Bolen, 2012 WL 4856753 at *4. 
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after the action commences, at least for now, may still do so without fear of being 
hit with plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs should the case be remanded.194 
The third and most poignant aspect of Bolen and Ludwig with regard to the Sly 
hypothetical is presented most clearly in Ludwig, “[i]f a plaintiff chooses to include 
the inchoate bad faith claim in his original complaint, [is it] part of the ‘case’ in 
determining the amount in controversy? Most federal courts have said no, finding 
that removal is premature.”195  Consequently, if Sharp wants to avoid potentially 
being unable to remove Sly’s action more than a year after its commencement and 
seeks to remove it immediately, he must abate the bad faith action, given that the 
underlying property damage claim is limited to the $25,000 limits of the property 
damage policy. Sharp may very likely be unable to rely on the value of the bad 
faith action to establish the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold required for diversity 
cases
196
 to remove Sly’s action. So how can Attorney Sharp preserve his client’s 
ability to adjudicate the bad faith action in the more favorable, federal jurisdiction?  
While the Middle District had not, since Lahey, addressed the issue of a bad 
faith cause of action added to a state action more than one year after the initial 
action was commenced, the Middle District recently addressed a similar issue in 
Ingram v. Forbes Company.
197
 In Ingram, the injured plaintiff brought a negligence 
action in state court against the mall, the store where she was injured, and the store 
manager.
198
 After the store manager was terminated as a party to the action, the 
remaining defendants removed the action on diversity grounds and the plaintiff 
sought to remand, arguing that removal was untimely.
199
 
The basis for the defendants’ removal of the action in Ingram is the same basis 
that a defendant in a state action would utilize if a bad faith cause of action was 
added to an action that was pending for more than one year and was not removable 
when initially filed: 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
200
 To support their remand of the action, 
the Ingram defendants argued that the court granted the order to allow the plaintiff 
to amend her complaint and add parties; the decision also reset the clock on 
removal.
201
  Even if the removal clock had not been reset, the defendants contended 
that the court should equitably toll the one-year limitation on removal because the 
plaintiff acted in bad faith to defeat diversity, until the one year deadline to remove 
had run.
202
 The Ingram court did not adopt the defendants’ argument, however, and 
the court remanded the action back to state court, noting that “[e]ven if Plaintiff 
had added an additional defendant—which she did not—the addition of a party or 
claim does not commence the action anew.”203 The court went on to quote a case 
 ________________________  
 194. Bolen, 2012 WL 4856753 at *4. 
 195. Ludwig, 2013 WL 2406320 at *4 (citing Bolen, 2012 WL 4856753 at *3). 
 196. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (2013). 
 197. Ingram v. Forbes Co., No. 6:13-cv-381-Orl-37GJK, 2013 WL 1760202 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2013).  
 198. Id. at *1. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *2. 
 203. Ingram, 2013 WL 1760202 at *4. Id. at *2; Sasser, 126 F. Supp. 2d  at 1336 (“[T]he term 
‘commencement of action’ should be understood to refer to commencement of the action initially, and not as to 
any later addition of a particular party or claim.” (emphasis added)).  
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from the Southern District in its opinion, agreeing that, “[t]here is no indication in 
§ 1446 that an ‘action’ would ‘commence’ anew each time a claim is asserted or a 
party is added.”204 
In addressing the Ingram defendants’ argument that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith by committing fraudulent joinder, the court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1446 
“admits of no exceptions to the one-year limitation” and that the Eleventh Circuit 
and the U.S. Congress contemplated that, in some circumstances, plaintiffs can and 
will intentionally avoid federal jurisdiction.
205
 Further driving home its position, 
the Ingram court quoted the Eleventh Circuit: “a plaintiff who artfully pleaded his 
claim could avoid federal jurisdiction . . . such a result (if it is not good policy) 
should be remedied by congressional and not judicial action.”206  
Thus, the decision of the Middle District Court begs the question: In light of 
Ingram, will the Middle District conform to the Southern District’s holding in 
Lopez, in a situation similar to that presented in Lahey, where the initial complaint 
does not include a cause of action for bad faith, but rather the complaint is 
amended to, for the first time, add a claim for bad faith more than a year after the 
initial complaint is filed?
207
 Or, as intimated in Bolen and Ludwig, will the Middle 
District remain true to Lahey?
208
 And, perhaps more importantly, if the Eleventh 
Circuit is called to task, how should the Eleventh Circuit resolve the dispute? 
Further muddying the waters is a recent remand order from the Southern 
District in Symonette v. MGA Insurance Company.
209
 Symonette involved facts 
very similar to the hypothetical posed in this comment and, admittedly, provided 
the inspiration for this comment.
210
 Following a sua sponte order to show cause and 
timely response by defense counsel, the Southern District in Symonette determined 
that the defendant had not met its burden of demonstrating that removal was proper 
and remanded the case back to state court.
211
 The Symonette court reasoned that 
‘“[a] court’s analysis of the amount-in-controversy requirement focuses on how 
much is in controversy at the time of removal, [and] not later.”‘212 At the time of 
removal, plaintiff’s bad faith claim was not ripe and consequently the bad faith 
claim should not have been considered in determining the amount in 
controversy.
213
 Having been briefed by defense counsel’s motion opposing remand 
on the diverging views between the Middle and Southern District Courts, the 
 ________________________  
 204. Ingram, 2013 WL 1760202 at *2 (quoting Van Niekerk v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 12-62368-CIV, 2013 
WL 253693, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2013)).  
 205. Ingram, 2013 WL 1760202 at *2–3 (citing Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 
1994).  
 206. Id. at *3 (quoting Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094, n.4). 
 207. Lahey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1949-T27-TBM, 2008 WL 1766764, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2008). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Order Remanding Case to State Ct., Symonette v. MGA Ins. Co., No. 12-21428 CIV-
SEITZ/SIMONTON (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2012). 
 210. See Def’s. Resp. to Order to Show Cause and Integrated Mem. of Law Opposing Remand of Cause, at 
1–3, Symonette v. MGA Ins. Co., No. 12-21428 CIV-SEITZ/SIMONTON (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2012) (stating 
procedural history of the case).  
 211. Order Remanding Case to State Ct., supra note 209, at 3. 
 212. Id. at 2 (quoting Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 751 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
 213. Id. 
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Symonette court, responded to defendant’s argument that not removing the case 
when it did could mean that the defendant was precluded from removing it later 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1).
214
 In so doing, the court cited two Middle District 
opinions—one of which was Lahey—noting that “several cases have held that the 
addition of a bad faith claim after conclusion of the underlying coverage claim 
constitutes a separate and distinct cause of action from the underlying coverage 
claim and, thus, removal is not barred by the 1-year limitation in the removal 
statute.”215 Is the Southern District suggesting that it (or at least some of its judges) 
may be coming around to the Middle District’s line of thinking with regard to 
separate and independent bad faith causes of action? 
VII.  A PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO THE CLEVER/SHARP HYPOTHETICAL AND 
THE DILEMMA FACING INSURERS SEEKING TO REMOVE BAD FAITH ACTIONS 
TO FEDERAL COURT MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER THE ACTION HAS 
COMMENCED 
Resolution of this issue is important for a number of reasons; among them are 
concerns over the attorney’s fees and costs and appeals provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c) and (d).
216
 Specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the Southern District 
Court’s order remanding the case back to state court in Symonette is not 
appealable.
217
 Thus, in light of the divergence in opinion among the Southern and 
Middle District Courts (assuming arguendo that the Middle District stays true to 
Lahey in separate and independent bad faith cases), whether a defendant can 
currently adjudicate a bad faith cause of action (removed more than one year after 
commencement in state court) in federal court largely depends on whether the case 
is removed to the Southern or Middle District Court. 
In AFO, the plaintiff requested attorney’s fees and costs, arguing that the 
defendant had no reasonable grounds for removing the case to federal court.
218
 In 
declining to award attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the AFO 
court noted: 
[t]he Supreme Court has held that, “absent unusual circumstances, 
attorney’s fees should not be awarded [under Section 1447(c)] 
when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for 
removal. . . .”219 Although the district court has discretion in 
awarding such fees, the court should consider “the desire to deter 
 ________________________  
 214. Order Remanding Case to State Ct., supra note 209, at 3. 
 215. Id. 
 216. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (c)-(d) provide, in relevant part respectively, that “[a]n order remanding the case 
may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the 
removal,” and that “[a]n order remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed is not reviewable on 
appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the state from which it was removed pursuant to 
section 1442 and 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” § 1442 pertains to federal officers 
or agencies sued or prosecuted and § 1443 pertains to civil rights cases.  
 217. Id. § 1447(d). 
 218. AFO, 2012 WL 3764887 at *2. 
 219. Id. (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005)). 
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removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation . . . while 
not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a 
right to remove.”220 
In light of the most recent opinions from the Middle and Southern District 
Courts on this issue, the question then becomes: At what point will a party 
removing a bad faith action filed in Florida state court to federal district court, no 
longer have “objectively reasonable” grounds for removal?221  
Let us return once again to the hypothetical lawsuit with which we began. 
Assuming arguendo that the Middle District adheres to Lahey and that the Southern 
District stays true to Lopez in bad faith causes of action, how should the Eleventh 
Circuit resolve this dispute? 
“A defendant’s right to remove an action against it from state to federal court 
‘is purely statutory and therefore its scope and the terms of its availability are 
entirely dependent on the will of Congress.’”222 Considering the stated purpose of 
the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act and congressional 
commentary related thereto and discussed in preceding sections, the purpose of the 
“modest curtailment” in diversity cases was to relieve the burgeoning federal court 
caseloads and to reduce the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has 
been made in state court.
223
 As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 appears to accomplish 
the former; however, the latter does not generally apply to separate and 
independent bad faith causes of action in Florida, which do not ripen until 
resolution of the underlying coverage or breach action.
224
 
Seemingly, to address the “tactical chicanery,” David D. Siegel wrote about in 
his commentary on the amendments to 28 U.S.C. §1446,
225
 on December 7, 2012, 
28 U.S.C. § 1446 was again amended by modifying section 1446 in relevant part to 
reflect: 
(c) Requirements; removal based on diversity of citizenship.—(1) 
A case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of 
jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than 1 year after 
commencement of the action, unless the district court finds that 
 ________________________  
 220. Id. (quoting Bauknight v. Monroe Cnty, Fla., 446 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2006)).  
 221. The issue of objective reasonableness and when an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c) goes beyond the scope of this comment and will not be discussed further herein. The question is posed, 
however, to accentuate the need for a prompt resolution on Florida federal district courts’ interpretation of 28 
U.S.C. § 1446 in the context of separate and independent bad faith causes of action. For a detailed analysis of 
treatment of the attorney’s fees and costs issue, see Thomas Fusco, 119 A.L.R. Fed. 433 and more specifically, 
Roxbury Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency, 316 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2003); Coman v. Int’l Playtex, 
Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Smith v. Health Cent. of Lake City, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (M.D. 
Fla. 2003); Ruiz v. Carnival Corp., No. 11-23170-CIV, 2012 WL 626222, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2012).  
 222. Potts v. Harvey, No. 11-80495-CIV-MARRA, 2011 WL 4637132, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2011) 
(quoting Global Satellite Commc’n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 223. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 cmt. (LEXIS through PL 113-36) (David D. Siegel). 
 224. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446 (West 2013). 
 225. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 cmt. (LEXIS through PL 113-36) (David D. Siegel). 
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the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant 
from removing the action . . . . 
(3)(A) If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable 
solely because the amount in controversy does not exceed the 
amount specified in section 1332(a), information relating to the 
amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in 
responses to discovery, shall be treated as an ‘other paper’ under 
subsection (b)(3). 
(B) If the notice of removal is filed more than 1 year after 
commencement of the action and the district court finds that the 
plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in 
controversy to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad 
faith under paragraph (1).
226
 
This most recent amendment, though it will undoubtedly level the tactical 
playing field for defendants seeking adjudication of claims in federal jurisdiction, 
does nothing to resolve the problem for insurer defendants who, after verdict is 
entered and appellate review is exhausted, seek for the first time to remove a newly 
added bad faith cause of action to a complaint originally served two years earlier. 
This is true especially in light of the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which 
was specifically amended to exclude “separate and independent” causes of action 
from diversity actions.
227
 Further, as evidenced by the Middle District Court’s 
unwillingness in April 2013 to equitably toll the deadline for removal of Ingram—
wherein the defendants claimed that the plaintiff had fraudulently joined a store 
manager, who was ultimately dismissed from the action on summary judgment, in 
order to destroy diversity until the removal clock had run—how heavy is the 
defendant’s burden to prove a plaintiff’s bad faith in destroying diversity?228  
As evidenced by the most recent amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, Congress 
arguably could, but has yet to further amend section 28 of the U.S. Code to provide 
relief for diverse defendants seeking to remove separate and independent causes of 
action (such as the formally recognized Florida bad faith cause of action).
229
 Given 
that the “separate and independent” language that once existed in the federal 
removal statute that gave diversity actions an avenue to remove cases to federal 
court more than thirty days after they were commenced was removed in 1990, 
Congress’ intent appears clear. As such, the Eleventh Circuit will likely determine 
that it is Congress’ intent to exclude even separate and independent bad faith 
causes of action from diversity removal jurisdiction absent bad faith by the 
 ________________________  
 226. See current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1446 as amended by the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act of 2011 (emphasis added). 
 227. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446.   
 228. Ingram v. Forbes Co., No. 6:13-cv-381-Orl-37GJK, 2013 WL 1760202, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 
2013). 
 229. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446. 
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plaintiff. Once again returning to our Sly hypothetical, Sly’s action will be 
remanded to the state court, perhaps to return again to federal district court, if Sly’s 
breach of contract action can be adjudicated in his favor within the approximately 
six months that remain on the one-year limitation after the cause is remanded, or if 
the proper federal jurisdiction for Sly is the Middle District.  
Consideration of well-established and often cited rules of law espoused by the 
Eleventh Circuit lend further support for the Eleventh Circuit’s likely resolution of 
the dispute between the Southern and Middle District courts (and the Sly 
hypothetical), consistent with the Southern District’s well-reasoned opinions in 
Lopez and Moultrop. Removal statutes are construed narrowly, with uncertainties 
about jurisdiction resolved in favor of remand.
230
 “A presumption in favor of 
remand is necessary because if a federal court reaches the merits of a pending 
motion in a removed case where subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking[,] it 
deprives a state court of its right under the Constitution to resolve controversies in 
its own courts.”231 
If “Congress extends the benefits and safeguard of federal courts to ‘provide a 
separate forum for out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local courts and 
local juries,’”232 then certainly preventing insurers from adjudicating bad faith 
causes of action in federal court is not what Congress intended by amending 28 
U.S.C. § 1441. If the Lopez court is correct and Congress’ goal in amending 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 was to prevent removal after substantial progress is made in state 
court,
233
 then, arguably, this goal is not served in cases like the one presented in the 
Sly hypothetical, wherein the underlying breach of contract action would be proven 
by substantially different evidence than that of the later accruing bad faith cause of 
action. Further, because bad faith actions do not exist or accrue until the underlying 
action is adjudicated favorably to the plaintiff, this necessarily means that the 
underlying action will have concluded by the time the bad faith action is alleged by 
amended pleading and removal sought. The same holds true with bad faith actions 
alleged in the initial complaint that are abated.  
The Florida Supreme Court made clear in Blanchard and Vest that a statutory 
action for bad faith does not exist until the underlying breach of contract action is 
adjudicated in favor of the insured.
234
 As the Southern District has acknowledged, 
commencement of an action is generally determined by state law,
235
 which, in 
Florida, is when the complaint is filed.
236
 Since an action for bad faith cannot exist 
until the bad faith claim accrues, how can it be said to have “commenced” when 
 ________________________  
 230. Moultrop v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Henderson v. 
Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2006); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 
2006)). 
 231. Lopez v. Robinson Aviation (RVA), Inc., No. 10-60241-CIV, 2010 WL 3584446, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 
21, 2010) (quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
 232. Holston Investments, Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 1830, at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02). 
 233. Lopez, 2010 WL 3584446 at *3. 
 234. See Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 1991); Vest v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 1270, 1270 (Fla. 2000). 
 235. See Moultrop, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1346. 
 236. Id. (quoting FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.050). 
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the initial complaint is filed, whether or not the claim for bad faith is initially pled? 
Should a separate and independent bad faith cause of action only commence once it 
has accrued?  
Unfortunately, until the Eleventh Circuit resolves this divergence in opinion 
consistent with the Middle District Court’s decision in Lahey, or until Congress 
further amends 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to once again allow removal of separate and 
independent causes of action, Florida insurers and defense counsel attempting to 
defend bad faith actions added more than a year after commencement of the 
underlying action (when the underlying claim does not on its own meet the $75,000 
federal jurisdictional threshold or is otherwise not removable) may be left 
adjudicating bad faith causes of action in state court—especially in the Southern 
District. In light of “[t]he Eleventh Circuit[‘s] [urging] district courts to heed the 
‘bright line limitations on federal removal jurisdiction’ as ‘an inevitable feature of 
a court system of limited jurisdiction that strictly construes the right to remove,’”237 
perhaps the time has come for the Florida legislature to pick up where it left off in 
2011 and reconsider amending Florida’s statutory bad faith laws, if Florida insurers 
are to find more equal footing in the face of the rather ugly bad faith “set up.”  
 
 ________________________  
 237. Suncoast Country Clubs, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:06-CV-1238-T-23MSS, 2006 WL 2534197, 
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2006) (quoting Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 
2001)). 
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